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I present the following proposal: information revealed during non-cartel investigations by 
competition law enforcement authorities, such as evaluation of M&As or investigation of 
monopolization (dominance) conduct, should be directly used to investigate and prosecute 
cartels. Currently, in several jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A 
investigation typically cannot be directly used for a cartel case due to the underlying statutes 
and the legal and administrative procedures that govern information use. Reviewing the 
management and corporate strategy literature, I note that M&As form a vital part of firms’ 
core business strategy, with the longer-run strategic aspects being more important. These 
longer-run strategies could be jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the 
likelihood of detection and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which 
would punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly how many cartels 
are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the likelihood of creating a 
meaningful deterrence effect. I also discuss the potential downsides related to Type 1 errors 
and administrative costs. Overall, I argue that the proposed rule change could increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of cartel enforcement, and open an additional front in the fight 
against hardcore cartels that operate within jurisdictions as well as internationally. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Cartels pose significant problems in many dimensions. The most common effect 
noted relates to the increase in prices of goods and services, with consequent loss 
of welfare. Cartels can also result in lower product variety and quality. Offering 
greater  variety  and  better  quality  typically  involve  costly  investments  by  the 
firms, and collusion serves to reduce costly competition which benefits the firms, 
but harms consumers who may be left with inferior or a reduced product choices. 
Cartels may also lead to reduced innovation in the affected markets. Innovation 
by firms brings new products and processes into the markets, but innovation is 
typically (very) costly. Collusion may occur to reduce such costly investments, 
but this harms consumers and markets, and affects longer-run economic growth 
and productivity.
2 To the extent that reduced collusion would provide enhanced 
benefits in all  of these dimensions, the  relevant markets and the  economy as a 
whole would benefit. This  encompassing  understanding has been th e central 
reason for greatly increased cartel enforcement by the US since the late -1970s, 
and by the European Commission, and other jurisdictions, since the  1990s. The 
tools used to disincentivize formation and continuation of cartels  have included 
increased  monetary  fines,  introduction  and  refinement  of  amnesty/leniency 
programs, and incarceration in some jurisdictions.
3  
                                                 
2 As an example, the complexity of collusion cases is revealed in the U.S. antitrust case: ALLIED 
TUBE V. INDIAN HEAD, INC., 486 U. S. 492 (1988). In this case, Allied Tube had set standards 
for steel based electrical wire conduits in buildings and these standards had been incorporated into 
safety codes of local governments. A new entrant came into the market with high-quality low-cost 
plastic  based  electrical  wire  conduit.  As  required,  the  entrant  initiated  a  proposal  before  the 
National Fire Protection Association to extend code approval to the new plastic conduit. Before 
the Association’s 1980 annual meeting was held, the nation’s largest producer of steel conduit, 
members of the steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and independent sales agents 
collectively agreed to exclude the new entrant’s product from the 1981 code by packing the annual 
meeting  with  new  Association  members  whose  only  function  was  to  vote  against  entrant’s 
proposal.  Over  280  members  colluded  to  vote  against  the  new  entrant’s  product,  the  key 
motivation being that the new plastic conduits were much cheaper and would drive many of the 
metal-based conduit manufacturers out of the market. The Association members then proceeded to 
lobby local governments and other entities that the new plastic conduits were unsafe, posed fire 
hazards,  when  in  fact  none  of  this  was  true.  The  Association’s  coordinated  action  prevailed, 
resulting in harm to competition. The final decisions in this case came from the U.S. Supreme 
Court  in  1988.  Looking  at  this  case  in  a  bigger-picture  sense,  the  collective  action  by  the 
incumbents against the new entrant not only prevented consumers from immediately accessing a 
lower-priced plastic electrical conduit, but also affected the provision of variety and quality, and 
innovation, in the relevant market. 
3 Recent years have seen significant initiatives and enforcement activities in prosecuting cartels. 
The academic literature has also seen significant contributions in at least two broad areas. The first 
area relates to the fine-tuning of the carrots (e.g., leniency programs which provide incentives for 
firms to come clean with information to avoid penalties) and  sticks (severity of penalties such as 3 
 
  In this paper I outline a specific proposal to enhance cartel enforcement, 
one that is somewhat different from the tools that are currently in use (noted in 
footnote 3). My proposal: sanction direct use of information and data revealed 
during  non-cartel  investigations  (e.g.,  M&A  reviews  and  monopolization/ 
dominance)  to  investigate  and  prosecute  cartels.  Currently,  in  several 
jurisdictions, information acquired in, for example, a M&A case typically cannot 
be directly used for a cartel  prosecution. The underlying reasons relate to the 
statutes and the historical legal and administrative procedures typically being very 
different for non-cartel and cartel cases. 
  I  argue  that  such  a  rule  change,  allowing  information  from  non-cartel 
investigations and cases to be directly used to prosecute cartels, is likely to yield 
benefits that would result from the deterrence effect which  may be high, and, 
under specific circumstances, be even larger than the monetary fines or corporate 
leniency  mechanisms  that  have  been  instituted  in  many  jurisdictions.  The 
deterrence effect, in a strategic sense, implies that it is not particularly important 
precisely how many cartels might be prosecuted under such a rule change. The 
disincentive  mechanism  that  is  created  may  be  sufficiently  large  to  diminish 
formation and continuation of collusive agreements, and this may particularly be 
important  for some of the larger firms  and multinationals  that are engaged in 
large-scale  and  damaging  domestic  and  international  collusive  agreements.  I 
argue that the proposal would open an additional, and potentially powerful, front 
in the fight against cartels.  
  The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  section  2,  I  briefly  note  the 
administrative and legal rules that apply to the direct use of information from non-
cartel investigations to prosecute cartels. To develop my proposal, in section 3 I 
                                                                                                                                     
monetary  fines,  and  incarceration  in  the  US)  approach  to  detection  and  enforcement.  Aubert 
(2007), for example, provides an insightful discussion of leniency programs in various countries 
and the penalties versus rewards structure of deterrence programs and their effectiveness. Chen 
and Harrington (2007) theoretically examine the effects of leniency programs on the formation 
and stability of cartels. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) present an analysis of the interaction 
between fines and leniency programs in deterrence. Connor (2007) examines fines and penalties 
imposed  on  modern  international  cartels  and  contributes  to  the  current  debate  about  the 
effectiveness of global antitrust sanctions to deter international price-fixing conduct. The OECD 
(2007) report provides details on the effectiveness of sanctions and the experiences of different 
countries.  The  second  area  provides  insights  into  firms’  behavior  and  the  conditions  that  are 
conducive to the formation and stability of cartels. For example, Kovacic et al. (2007) infer that 
vitamins markets that were duopolies had significantly greater likelihood of collusion as opposed 
to  those  with  greater  number  of  firms.  Levenstein  and  Suslow  (2006)  present  information  on 
market conditions that facilitate stability of cartels. Connor (2003 and 2006) presents details about 
conduct and market characteristics in the lysine, citric acid and vitamins cartels. Also, see Connor 
(2008),  Dick  (1998),  Hammond  (2008),  Harding  and  Joshua  (2004),  Harrington  (2008b)  and 
Porter (2005) for discussion of related issues. Since these areas have a well known and extensive 
literature, I do not elaborate on the details here. 4 
 
use the US antitrust enforcement context to examine the nature of information 
flows  that give rise to  cartel  investigations,  discuss  confidentiality issues,  and 
examine potential information spillovers from non-cartel investigations and cases 
to cartel cases under the existing mechanisms. Since the US has a long history of 
cartel enforcement, this jurisdiction serves as a useful example to highlight some 
of the issues that I consider in this paper. 
  To  examine  information  spillovers,  in  section  4.1  I  provide  selected 
examples from competition law enforcement cases. To complement the discussion 
in section 4.1, in section 4.2 I present a brief analysis of US antitrust enforcement 
data over 1969-2009 to examine potential linkages between non-cartel and cartel 
investigations under existing mechanisms. While the empirical exercise in section 
4.2 is to be treated as suggestive, my results indicate that an increase in past 
merger and monopolization, “civil”, investigations and court cases filed lead to an 
increase  in  future  cartel  prosecutions.  Taken  at  face  value,  the  illustrative 
examples in section 4.1 and the cursory empirical analysis in section 4.2 provide 
suggestive information that at least some of the eventual cartel prosecutions have 
their true investigative information origins in non-cartel investigations. While the 
selected  antitrust  cases  and  the  empirical  results  I  present  are  suggestive, 
ultimately we know very little about the true origins of cartel investigations, and, 
in particular, the potential flows of information from non-cartel investigations to 
cartel investigations due to the stringent confidentiality restrictions that apply to 
such investigations.  
  In  section  5,  I  spell  out  my  proposal  of  sanctioning  direct  use  of 
information  and  data  revealed  during  non-cartel  investigations  to  prosecute 
cartels.  The  proposal  is  designed  to  be  used  by  any  jurisdiction  that  has 
established competition laws and enforcement, as well as those countries that are, 
for the first time, designing their competition institutions, laws and enforcement 
mechanisms.  Reviewing  studies  from  the  management  and  corporate  strategy 
literatures,  I  note  that  M&As  (along  with  joint-ventures  and  alliances),  for 
example,  form  a  vital  part  of  firms’  business  strategy,  with  the  longer-run 
strategic impacts being the dominant aspects. These strategies could be seriously 
jeopardized if the firms were engaging in collusion, as the likelihood of detection 
and prosecution would increase under the proposed rule change, which would 
fairly severely punish bad (collusive) behavior. I argue that irrespective of exactly 
how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, the proposal has the 
likelihood of creating a meaningful deterrence effect. Finally, I end section 5 by 
discussing the potential downsides of the proposal by highlighting Type 1 errors 
(false positives) and the administrative and transactions costs that may arise from 
the proposal and rule change. Overall, I note that, under the proposed rule change, 
the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of  cartel  enforcement  is  likely  to  increase, 




2.  Legal and administrative guidelines on the direct use of 
information from non-cartel investigations 
 
In this section I briefly discuss details from selected jurisdictions to indicate the 
nature of the constraints related to the sharing of information. The issue of using 
non-cartel information to prosecute cartels is a complex one as many jurisdictions 
have explicit rules governing spillover and direct use of such information. 
  For  European  Commission  competition  law  enforcement,  for  example, 
there is a clear distinction between use of data and information as “intelligence” 
versus  “direct  use”  in  evidence  to  prosecute  cartels.  Article  17(1)  of  the  EC 
Merger Regulation provides that information collected under that regulation can 
only  be  used  for  the  relevant  request,  investigation  or  hearing.  This  excludes 
direct use in an Article 101 or 102 TFEU investigation. The same is laid out in 
Article 28 of Regulation 1/2003 concerning the competition law procedure, where 
any information collected can only be used for the relevant procedure. Whereas, 
under EC laws, they cannot transfer evidence from one procedure to another, they 
can start a new procedure when significant suspicions are raised concerning a 
market  in,  for  example,  a  merger  investigation.  The  restriction  of  using  the 
information coming from the merger investigation for, say, a cartel prosecution is 
a procedural rule, as merger and cartel investigations pursue different purposes 
and look at different situations. In the light of the ECJ judgment of 17 October 
1989  in  Case  85/87  Dow  Benelux,  it  probably  does  not  preclude  the  use  as 
intelligence, allowing the same information to be collected again under a separate 
Article  101  or  102  TFEU  investigation.  The  fact  that  EC  has  to  collect  new 
evidence for that procedure in a separate investigation will inevitably delay the 
eventual prosecution of a cartel, and may cause other procedural and investigative 
uncertainties. 
  Considering a very different jurisdiction, there are recent examples from 
the Competition Commission of South Africa where information revealed during 
merger  investigations  about  cartel  behavior  could  not  be  used  directly  to 
prosecute cartels. These relate to the recent cases in the plastic pipes and scrap 
metal  industries).
4  Since  the  enforcement  division  of  the  South  African 
Commission could not use the information provided by the merging  parties 
directly in its investigations, the eventual cartel investigations took over 3 years to 
complete as independent inquiries. The existence of such administrative and legal 
procedural  rules  on  direct  and  explicit  use  of  information  increases  the 
transactions costs and inevitably delays prosecuting cartels. 
                                                 
4 See OECD (2010) and Ngobeni (2010). 6 
 
  In the US, the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division is tasked 
with  cartel  enforcement.  From  the  US  Department  of  Justice’s  Antitrust 
Guidelines, if information were to be revealed during a merger or monopolization 
investigation,  the  procedures  explicitly  instruct  legal  staff  to  clearly  separate 
cartel  (criminal)  investigations  from  merger  and  monopolization  (civil) 
investigations, and pursue independent lines of inquiry and investigations. The 
issues related to transactions costs, uncertainties and delays are similar to those 
noted above. 
  Turning  to  Taiwan,  the  Taiwan  Fair  Trade  Commission  could  use  the 
information  from  non-cartel  cases  to  investigate  cartel  cases,  with  some 
administrative  and  legal  barriers  on  the  extent  to  which  there  is  direct  pass-
through  of  the  information  from  the  non-cartel  case  to  the  cartel  case.  For 
example,  in  recent  years,  while  investigating  a  complaint  alleging  predatory 
pricing in the Liquid Petroleum Gas market (the case of predatory pricing in the 
LPG market of Chia-yi area), the TFTC found suspected evidence on collusion 
and this lead to an ex-officio investigation on the matter.  
  In  Japan,  there  are  two  levels  of  investigations:  “Administrative 
Investigations” of cartels, and “Compulsory Investigations of Criminal Cases”. It 
is not illegal to use information obtained in investigation of non-cartel cases for 
“Administrative” investigations. However, for “Compulsory” investigations, the 
investigators cannot use information which is obtained in investigation of non-
cartel  cases.  It  is  controversial  in  terms  of  other  kinds  of  laws  (the  Japanese 
Constitution, for example) to use those kinds of information in investigation of 
criminal cases of cartels. The most significant difference between Administrative 
investigations  and  Compulsory  investigations  of  criminal  cases  is  that  in 
Compulsory investigations the investigators (with warrant of judges) can  visit, 
search or seize suspected firms by direct compulsion, and finally can bring cases 
to the Attorney General who then files the cases in district court (and firms and/or 
individuals,  engaging  collusion,  could  be  fined  and  sentenced  in  prison).  In 
contrast, in Administrative investigations, the investigators can visit and search 
suspected firms by “indirect” enforcement, but the Commission, not the Attorney 
General, finally issues “the Cease and Desist Order” and “the Payment Order of 
Surcharge” to cartel firms. 
  The above information, as well as information from other jurisdictions, 
appear to reveal differences across jurisdictions in terms of the stringency of the 
constraint of using non-cartel investigations data to directly prosecute cartels. But 
in many important jurisdictions, there are clear rules that provide barriers to the 
flow  of  data  and  information  directly  from  non-cartel  to  cartel  cases  and 
prosecutions. As I argue in section 5, altering these restrictions would lead to 
greater effectiveness and efficiency of cartel enforcement, potentially leading to 
meaningful welfare gains. 7 
 
 
3.  Information flows and cartel prosecutions 
 
As  noted  in  the  introduction,  since  the  US  has  a  long  history  of  cartel 
enforcement, I use information from this jurisdiction to highlight some of the core 
issues that I examine in this paper. As I note in section 6, many of the issues that I 
discuss  below  find  common  ground  in  cartel  enforcement  across  other 
jurisdictions. The spirit of the analysis, the inferences I draw and the proposal I 
outlined, have relevance across international jurisdictions.  
  The origins of cartel investigations and the investigative procedures are 
considerably  different  from  other  types  of  investigations  such  as  mergers  and 
monopolization. For example, in the US it is mandatory for firms to file for a 
merger to be approved if the market value of the transaction is above the specified 
regulatory threshold. The specific merger approval filing rules and criteria vary 
across jurisdictions. The fact that a merger is being proposed is not a secret to the 
competition authority once the parties file for approval. The competition authority 
examines various issues related to market power, potential efficiencies, among 
others, and makes a determination on whether or not to challenge the merger. 
Mergers  fall  under  a  rule  of  reason  criteria  where  the  presumption  is  no 
significant market power resulting from the merger. If, based on the evidence and 
assessment,  the  competition  authority  infers  otherwise,  the  merger  can  be 
challenged  in  court  and/or  remedies  proposed.  Monopolization  (abuse  of 
dominance)  investigations  result  from  potential  behavioral  violations  of 
competitive conduct, and the vast majority of monopolization conduct also fall 
under  rule  of  reason  criteria.
5  In  contrast  to  mergers,  investigations  in 
monopolization cases typically begin after evidence becomes available to the 
antitrust authority via complaints file d by other firms or buyers in the affected 
markets.  
  Cartels, in contrast to merger and monopolization cases, have been  per se 
illegal in US antitrust for a very long time. Consider, for example, the case United 
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). The U.S. Department of 
Justice sued U.S.  and  British firms  for domestic and global  market  allocation 
schemes, and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the conduct was illegal. Under 
current  competition  law  enforcement  regimes,  cartels  are  illegal  in  most 
jurisdictions,  but  this  was  not  so  historically.  Cartels  are  covert  and  pose 
significant problems of detection and, as evidenced by some of the high profile 
prosecutions  in  the  lysine,  vitamins,  graphites,  and  numerous  bid-rigging 
                                                 
5 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the changes in US and EC competition laws over 
time and which types of monopolization (dominance) conduct were always under rule of reason 
versus those that have had mixed legal and enforcement histories. 
  8 
 
investigations,  firms  engaging  in  collusion  can  take  elaborate  precautions  and 
have  complicated  schemes  to  avoid  detection.  The  economy  is  very  large 
comprising of tens and thousands of markets and firms, and the resources of the 
competition authority are quite limited, implying that it is simply not possible for 
them to launch an active campaign of using their own resources to detect cartels 
economy-wide. This may be an effective strategy in some sectors and in specific 
circumstances, but nearly impossible on a consistent and large-scale basis. This 
implies  that  information  on  potential  collusive  activity  has  to  filter  into  the 
investigative offices of the competition authority from various sources such as 
competitors,  customers  and  employees.  Without  this  information,  cartel 
enforcement would be very difficult and costly.  
  This raises the question of how do cartel investigations begin. In order to 
examine the true origins – “seeds” – of  cartel investigations and prosecutions by 
the competition authority, one would need information on these information flows 
(i.e., original complaints by competitors, customers, among others). However, due 
to  stringent  confidentiality  restrictions  about  the  source  of  information  that 
triggered an investigation, this information is not publicly available for the vast 
majority of cases. This poses considerable constraints on getting a clear picture of 
the underlying process of discovery of cartels and investigations. 
  The  origins  of  cartel  investigations  by  the  antitrust  authority  can  be 
myriad: 
1.  One  cartel  investigation  may  reveal  information  about  other  potential 
cartels  in  the  same  or  related  markets.  For  example,  the  US  Antitrust 
Division’s  investigation  of  the  lysine  cartel  involving  Archer-Daniels 
Midlands  and  several  Asian  firms  unearthed  evidence  on  vitamin  and 
related cartels leading to their prosecution including large multinationals 
like  Hoffman-La  Roche  and  Rhone-Poulenc.  Bid-rigging  in  the 
construction  industry  appears  pervasive  and,  in  terms  of  investigative 
efforts, information revealed during one construction bid-rig often provide 
clues to other bid-rigs. Block and Feinstein (1986), for example, present 
evidence  from  the  highway  construction  industry  where  the  Antitrust 
Division  prosecuted  about  200  contractors  on  charges  of  bid-rigging. 
Bergeijk  et  al.  (2007)  provide  related  evidence  from  the  Dutch 
construction industry. 
2.  Information provided by other firm(s) in the market. For example, in 1999 
a  settlement  was  reached  in  a  milk  price-fixing  case  where  Marigold 
Foods, Land O’ Lakes, Geo Benz and Sons, and Marigold Venture along 
with  Dairies  Trade  Association  were  the  accused.  Origin  of  this 
investigation was information revealed by another firm in the market. 
3.  Dramatic  price  changes.  Often,  prices  wars  that  break  out  between 
competitors  may  signal  breakdown  of  potential  collusive  agreements. 9 
 
Similarly rapid increase in prices or complaints by consumers about rising 
prices  and  suspicion  of  cartel-like  activities.  These  have  occurred  in 
myriad  products  such  as  school  milk  contracts,  electricity,  local 
construction  projects,  gasoline,  cable  television,  natural  gas,  airline 
pricing, among others. For example, in 2001, at the height of California’s 
energy crisis, the price of natural gas spiked about 700% as it crossed the 
state  line  on  an  El  Paso  Corporation  pipeline.  This  increase  in  price 
prompted complaints by various groups leading to judicial investigation 
and  eventual  prosecution.  El  Paso  Corp.  was  accused  to  have  entered 
secret  deals  –  recorded  in  phone  and  other  conversations  –  to  cut  out 
competitors and drive up prices. Subsequently when El Paso Corp. gave 
up control of the flow of gas, prices plummeted. During the same time 
period, the California Independent System Operator found that prices in 
2000 were 10 times higher than in 1999 and the electric companies had 
withheld power through bidding strategies. In 1999, the Nevada Grocery 
Retailers filed a complaint with the State Dairy Association accusing local 
and  regional  dairies  with  collusion.  In  2000,  the  Colorado  Attorney’s 
General  office initiated an investigation into gasoline price fixing after 
receiving numerous complaints from local businesses and individuals of 
suspected collusion. 
4.  Information via the leniency program. There are many examples related to 
this, including the Sotheby’s and Christie’s auction house conspiracy, and 
the vitamins cartel where Rhone-Poulenc collaborated with the authorities 
to provide evidence against Hoffman La Roche and BASF. 
5.  Information  uncovered  while  studying  bidding  patterns.  For  example, 
these  have  occurred  in  local  or  nation  markets  as  part  of  government 
contracts and products have ranged from timber, military supplies, milk, 
petroleum, aluminum, construction projects and waste disposal. 
6.  Information  discovered  during  the  process  of  non-cartel  (merger  or 
monopolization) investigations may reveal information about cooperative 
pricing and market allocation schemes in affected markets. This is a rather 
complicated area and I return to more discussion regarding this in section 
4.1 below. 
  The above points to the alternative sources of information that may lead to 
the genesis of cartel investigations. To get a complete picture of the investigative 
process,  we  also  need  to  understand  the  timeline  and  stages  of  cartel 
investigations  and  prosecution  process  once  information  becomes  available. 
While this investigative process varies considerably across different jurisdictions, 
I briefly note the main steps in the US process: 
1.  Depending  on  the  nature  of  the  initial  information,  a  preliminary 
investigation  is  opened.  If  the  initial  information  is  credible  and 10 
 
compelling,  the  US  Antitrust  Division  may  start  a  federal  grand  jury 
investigation immediately. Once credible information becomes available, 
it  may  take  between  3-6  months  on  average  to  get  to  the  grand  jury 
investigation  stage.  (The  grand  jury  is  rooted  in  centuries  of  Anglo-
American history and it’s role is to determine possible criminal violations 
of the federal laws and to return indictments against culpable corporations 
and individuals where there is probable cause to believe that a violation 
has occurred. It’s proceedings are also designed to protect citizens against 
unfounded criminal prosecutions.) 
2.  The  head  of  the  Antitrust  Division  has  to  sign  off  on  a  grand  jury 
investigation. The grand jury comprises of a group of several individuals 
who become privy to the confidential information that forms part of the 
Antitrust  Division’s  case.  The  investigation  begins  with  the  Antitrust 
Division  issuing  subpoenas  for  documents.  Since  the  process  is 
confidential, sometimes the grand jury deliberations may be the first time 
the  defendant  hears  about  the  accusations  leveled  by  the  Antitrust 
Division.  If,  on  completion  of  the  grand  jury  hearings,  there  is  ample 
evidence, the Antitrust Division prepares a draft indictment. The Assistant 
Attorney General of the Antitrust Division makes the final decision on 
whether  or  not  to  indict  certain  individuals.  The  actual  grand  jury 
proceedings may take some time. If an investigation has been approved by 
the Antitrust Division, but the grand jury has not convened as yet, it is 
listed as pending. Between the previous stage and this one, it may take 
about 6-9 months on average. 
3.  If the grand jury returns an indictment, the case goes to court under the 
Speedy Trial Act for criminal investigations. Between the indictment and 
the case going to trial, the time lapse is typically about 3-4 months. 
4.  The  stages  in  court,  for  example,  include:  (a)  determining  guilt;  (b) 
assessing the volume of commerce involved and assessing liabilities; and 
(c) sentencing – penalties, fine, jail terms. Once the case goes to court, on 
average it takes 1-2 weeks for the trial to be over. (In a very small number 
of cases, there is settlement – preceded by what is called information filing 
– leading to a consent decree.) 
Overall, from when the information first becomes available to the conclusion of 
the case, on average it may take the US authorities between 18-24 months to 
collect the required evidence and prosecute cartel cases; in some cases, of course, 
the investigation may proceed faster while others may take more time. As noted 
earlier, while the above briefly describes the US process, the administrative and 
legal  procedures,  and  timeline  of  investigation,  will  vary  considerably  across 
different international jurisdictions. 
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4.  Information  spillovers  from  non-cartel  cases  and 
investigations to cartel cases 
 
As I noted in section 3, there are various sources of “seed” information that might 
lead to detection of cartels and prosecution. My focus in this paper is on the last 
potential  source:  “Potential  information  spillovers  from  non-cartel  (M&A  and 
monopolization)  investigations  and  cases  that  may  provide  the  initial  seed 
information for eventual cartel investigations and prosecutions.”  In this section I 
provide illustrative examples from the US and other jurisdictions to highlight this 
issue. 
  For several reasons, this is a very difficult area to get information on. First, 
the US Antitrust Division provides no public records of information about the 
origins of cartel investigations due to stringent confidentiality restrictions.
6 While 
sketchy information is available in selected high profile cases, the inner workings 
of the cartel investigations are closely guarded due to litigation and other factors. 
Similar,  stringent,  confidentiality  restrictions  apply  to  most  of  the  advanced 
jurisdictions.  
  Second,  there  are  protections  afforded  to  the  targets  of  cartel 
investigations, due to the per se, criminal, nature of the offense. Due to this, the 
Antitrust Division must make a call fairly early on whether to proceed with a non-
cartel or cartel investigation. Given this, even if initial information available in a 
non-cartel  case  leads  to  the  transition  to  a  cartel  case  and  results  in  a  cartel 
prosecution,  the  publicly  filed  indictment  and  supporting  papers  are  highly 
unlikely to reveal that the matter originated as a non-cartel investigation. Even if 
the  merger  or  monopolization  investigation  staffs  at  the  Antitrust  Division 
discover  evidence  of  cartel  violations,  they  have  to  transition  the  matter  to 
criminal (cartel) investigation status without tainting either investigation. Given 
these complexities and confidentiality issues, finding examples in this area proved 
extremely  difficult.
7  Below, I pursue a two -part approach to providing some 
                                                 
6 Even though I worked at the US Antitrust Division for several years, obtaining this information 
proved very hard. The strict confidentiality restrictions on information sources, likely accused, 
investigative procedures, etc, preclude availability of this information. Anecdotal information and 
word-of-mouth are more common. 
7  On the broader issue of information spillovers, they are quite common particularly within 
investigation categories. In section 3 (item #1) I noted spillovers from criminal to criminal. For 
other types of investigations, for  example, the Antitrust Division while evaluating the pending 
merger  between  First  Data  Inc.  and  Concord  EFS  Inc.  discovered  evidence  on  exclusivity 
contracts  between  Western  Union  Financial  Services  Inc.  and  retail  outlets  which  prevent 
competitors from setting up money-transfer systems at those outlets. This lead the Antitrust 
Division to start an investigation of Western Union and issue Civil Investigative Demands. See: 
“Western Union Gets DoJ CID,” Wall Street Journal, February 5, 2004; and “Exclusivity Pacts By 
Western Union At Stake in Probe,” Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2004. 12 
 
insights. In section 4.1 I provide illustrative examples from cases in the US and 
other jurisdictions.  And, in  section 4.2,  I  present  an empirical  analysis of the 
linkages between non-cartel and cartel cases using US antitrust enforcement data. 
 
4.1  Illustrative examples from competition law enforcement cases  
 
In spite of the stringent confidentiality restrictions noted above,  I was able to 
come up with some illustrative examples available in the public domain: 
1.  The US Antitrust Division’s successful challenge of the UPM Kymmene-
Bemis  MACtac  merger  several  years  back.  It  spawned  a  grand  jury 
investigation into alleged price fixing; 
2.  The  US  Antitrust  Division’s  investigation  of  the  proposed  Formica-
International Paper (Nevamar Division) merger – the Antitrust Division 
announced plans to challenge it, and the parties broke up the deal the next 
day. It spawned a grand jury price-fixing case against a competitor called 
WilsonArt which ended with a guilty plea on some of the charges; and 
3.  The US Federal Trade Commission’s “3 Tenors” case which came out of 
an HSR investigation of a proposed merger between Time Warner & EMI. 
The contracts that ultimately were challenged were discovered during the 
HSR (merger) investigation. 
  Regarding  other  jurisdictions,  stringent  restrictions  on  information 
conveyed to the public domain prevent a meaningful summary, but I was able to 
gather  some  evidence  on  information  spillovers  from  non-cartel  investigations 
resulting in cartel investigations and prosecutions. For example: 
1.  The  relatively  recent  non-cartel  investigations  at  the  Competition 
Commission  of  South  Africa  in  the  plastic  pipes  and  scrap  metal 
industries, which ultimately lead to cartel investigations and prosecutions 
(OECD, 2010; and Ngobeni, 2010); 
2.  At  the  Taiwan  FTC,  a  recent  investigation  into  a  complaint  alleging 
predatory  pricing  in  the  LPG  market  lead  to  an  ex  officio  cartel 
investigation on the matter; and 
3.  In  a  somewhat  different  case  involving  a  complex  international 
transaction,  the  hostile  bid  launched  by  the  Australian  company  BHP 
Billiton for takeover of Canadian firm Potash Corp., and the subsequent 
close scrutiny and analysis of this acquisition (a non-cartel investigation), 
brought  to  the  forefront  more  details  of  the  inner  workings  of  the 
Canadian/global Potash cartel.
8 
  While the above examples provide only a narrow window of information 
on the issue due to stringent confidentiality restrictions,  even under existing 
                                                 
8 For example, see the commentary by Dvorak and Kilman (2010) and Jenny (2010a, 2010b). 13 
 
relatively  high  barriers  for  information  flows  from  non-cartel  to  cartel 
investigations,  we  have  examples  that  the  non-cartel  area  of  competition  law 
investigations generating useful information for investigation of cartels.  
 
4.2  Empirical examination of potential linkages between non-cartel and 
cartel cases 
 
In section 4.1 I provided some illustrative examples on the linkages between non-
cartel and cartel cases, and noted the considerable difficulty of obtaining credible 
and accurate evidence on the extent to which information obtained during non-
cartel  investigations  provided  a  conduit  –  or  seed  information  –  for  cartel 
investigations and prosecutions. Much of the problems in trying to understand this 
issue  arises  from  the  stringent  confidentiality  restrictions,  and  the  information 
available is sparse and anecdotal. 
   In  this  section  I  pursue  a  complementary  approach,  by  using  publicly 
available data on various types of US non-cartel investigations and cases, and 
cartel  investigations  and  prosecutions,  to  empirically  examine  whether,  in  the 
broader  publicly  available  data,  there  is  any  suggestive  evidence  of  linkages 
between non-cartel investigations and cases, and cartel enforcement. To examine 
this,  the  question  I  pose  is:  Do  increases  in  non-cartel  enforcement 
(investigations,  cases  filed  in  court)  show  any  link  to  subsequent  cartel 
enforcement? As in section 4.1, this analysis is only meant to be suggestive of the 
potential linkages. 
 
4.2.1  Antitrust enforcement data 
 
The data on antitrust enforcement are from the U.S. Antitrust Division’s historical 
statistics over the period 1969-2009. Including earlier years was problematic as 
data were not available for some of the key variables I use. The enforcement data 
are on variables such as total cartel prosecutions (court cases),
9 number of cartel 
grand jury investigations, the number of firms and individuals prosecuted, merger 
and monopolization investigations  and court cases, as well  as the extent of 
funding allocated to the Antitrust Division. Table 1 summarizes the data used in 
the empirical analysis and presents summary statistics , and figures 1-3 display 
three important variables related to cartel investigations and prosecutions. The 
standard deviations relative to the mean values in  table 1, and the data in figures 
                                                 
9 The data on the total number of criminal (cartel) cases prosecuted are the data on  the total 
number of criminal court cases filed by the Antitrust Division minus miscellaneous criminal cases 
filed by the Antitrust Division related to obstruction of justice, false statements, mail fraud and 
perjury. This “correction” is important because the latter class of criminal cases have little to do 
with price-fixing and related violations which we are interested in. 14 
 
1-3, show fairly significant intertemporal fluctuations. The data on cartel cases 
(figure 1) show a markedly higher number of prosecutions during the 1980s, and 
then reverting to a somewhat lower mean in the 1990s, but still much higher than 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
 
Table 1. Variables and summary statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Cartel 
Cartel court cases 
46.65  25.62 
Indivs_Pros 
Individuals prosecuted 
59.00  27.54 
Firms_Pros 
Firms prosecuted 
64.53  41.77 
Civil_Invs 
Civil investigations 
281.92  104.52 
Civil_Cases 
Civil cases filed in court 
22.47  15.23 
GJInvs 
Grand jury investigations 
38.15  11.35 
GDP 
Real GDP growth 
0.03  0.02 
Notes: 
1. The data are annual and the time-period for all variables is 1969-2009. 
2. Civil investigations and cases include mergers and monopolization. 
3. Mean value of GDP growth is very small compared to the dependent variables, implying that, in 
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4.2.2  Examining the link between non-cartel and cartel cases 
 
The variables used in the empirical analysis are noted in table 1. I use the partial-
adjustment  framework  to  specify  the  empirical  equation  to  examine  the 
intertemporal time-path of cartel enforcement and some of its determinants. The 
partial-adjustment  mechanism  is  written  as                                 
   
          ,  where           is  the  actual  number  of  cartel  cases  in  time  t  and 
       
  is the optimal (or desired) number of cases. The actual change in the 
number of cartel cases from one period to the next is a fraction         of the 
optimal (or desired) change. The parameter λ typically being a fraction implies 
that  there  is  slow,  or  partial,  adjustment  to  the  optimal  target.  In  theory,  the 
partial-adjustment  parameter  λ  is  a  function  of  the  underlying  adjustment  and 
disequilibrium costs.
10 The above expression can be re-written as: 
                                                 
10 The partial-adjustment equation is derived from a quadratic cost-minimizing framework. In this 
framework,  the  decision-maker’s  objective  is  to  minimize  the  expected  present  value  of  a 
quadratic  loss  function  subject  to  adjustment  and  disequilibrium  costs.  The  theoretical  and 
empirical underpinnings of the framework  are well documented in Gould (1968), Kennan (1979) 16 
 
 
                                            
  
 
  One  can  think  of  adjustment  and  disequilibrium  costs  arising  for  the 
antitrust  decision-maker  as  follows.  First,  the  Antitrust  Division  (or  any 
Competition  Authority)  may  potentially  face  monetary  and  non-monetary 
constraints,  related  to  attorneys,  support  staff,  economists  and  budgets,  to 
undertake  cartel  as  well  as  non-cartel  (mergers,  monopolization,  restraints  of 
trade) investigations. The number of cartel investigations the Antitrust Division 
pursues, and consequently the number of prosecutions, may end up being less 
than the optimal number due to such constraints. 
  Second,  consider  a  situation  where  the  economy  has  numerous  price-
fixing conspiracies that result in higher prices, but the Antitrust Division is not 
vigorously  pursuing  cartel  investigations.  This  could  arise  either  because  the 
Antitrust Division is pre-occupied with other types of investigations, uninformed 
and unaware of these violations, that its current stance is one of less focus on 
cartel matters, or current stance is to focus mainly on specific types of cartels. The 
rise in prices often lead consumers to complain to their congressmen, senators and 
other interest groups, with calls for greater action and investigations.
11 Therefore, 
there is a tendency for correction if there is disequilibrium in the number of cartel 
cases pursued. 
  At the other end of the spectrum, suppose there is excessive activity by the 
Antitrust Division in terms of prosecuting companies for price-fixing and related 
behavior.  Producer  groups  may  lobby  the  legislators  to  have  the  Antitrust 
Division back off. Since being out of  equilibrium in the intensity  of  cartel 
enforcement implies greater scrutiny, the Antitrust Division  may have  to take 
corrective  action if the current level of enforcement is  either  too little or too 
much. 
  Thus, in our context, I assume that the Antitrust Division pursues cartel 
investigations and prosecutions subject to minimizing these two costs and makes 
a  sequence  of  actual            decisions  designed  to  meet  the  optimal  target 
       
 , which is a function of relevant driving variables noted below. 
  Next, the optimal target,        
 , is modeled as a function of the relevant 
driving variables. Some of the variables I consider are: 
1.  Are we in a high or low cartel enforcement Regime? The regime issue is 
noted in several papers: see, for example, Ghosal (2008a, 2011), Ghosal, 
                                                                                                                                     
and Treadway (1971). For more details, see Ghosal (2008a, 2011) who uses this procedure to 
model intertemporal movements in antitrust cases related to M&As, monopolization and cartels. 
11 As examples, some of the markets in the US where these have occurred include, for exampl e, 
retail gasoline, cable TV, airline, building contracts, school milk and lunch contracts, government 
procurement contracts, among others. 17 
 
Harrington  and  Stennek  (2007).  The  broad  picture  for  US  cartel 
enforcement is that there was a regime change in the late-1970s and early-
1980s, with significantly greater emphasis on clamping down on cartels. 
There were broader shifts in intellectual thinking about cartel enforcement 
and the political willingness to prosecute, and the focus of enforcement 
shifted to areas where there was likely to be clearer harm to welfare such 
as  collusion.
12  This  period  also  roughly  coincides  with  the  corporate 
leniency programs that were introduced in the US in 1978 and were 
refined further over several ye ars, culminating in a major revision in 
1993.
13  The  econometric  analysis  in  Ghosal  (2008a)  reveals  a  clear 
statistical break in the cartel enforcement data in 1980. 
2.  The pipeline of  investigations  into collusive activity. One variable that 
would  capture  this  would  be  the  number  of  grand  jury  investigations, 
which was discussed earlier in section 3. 
3.  The extent of non-cartel investigations and prosecutions. As noted in the 
discussion in section 4.1, I view this as one of the potential sources of seed 
information  that  might  lead  to  eventual  cartel  investigations  and 
prosecutions. 
4.  The level of economic activity in the economy. Economic conditions can 
be  a  conduit  for  information  flows  about  collusive  activity.  In  some 
instances information may flow into the Antitrust Division’s investigative 
offices when cartels break down, and, in other instances, when they are 
formed with consequent increases in prices. The conventional view on the 
link  between  economic  conditions  and  collusive  agreements  is 
summarized in Scherer (1980, p.206) who notes that: “there is evidence 
that  industries  characterized  by  high  overhead  costs  are  particularly 
susceptible to pricing discipline breakdowns when a cyclical or secular 
decline in demand forces member firms to operate well below designed 
plant capacity.” He provides examples from industries such as cement, 
mining, chemicals, steel and aluminum. According to this view, collusion 
is likely to break down during periods of low  demand. Levenstein and 
Suslow  (2006)  review  a  number  of  studies  and  note  that  cheating  and 
negative  external  shocks  appear  to  be  important  contributors  to  cartel 
breakdowns.
14  Overall,  the  conclusion  one  can  draw  is  that  adverse 
                                                 
12 Discussion of these issues along with empirical evidence are contained in, for example, Baker 
(2002, 2003), Crandall and Winston (2003), Kovacic and Shapiro (2000), Ghosal (2008a, 2011), 
Ghosal and Gallo (2001) and Ghosal, Harrington and Stennek (2007). 
13 See, for example, Griffin (2003), Harrington (2008a), Hunton and Williams (2003), Kobayashi 
(2001), Kolaski (2002), Klein (1999), Motta (2004, p.192 -194) and Paul (2000) note the various 
facets and effectiveness of the program. 
14 In terms of duration, Levenstein and Suslow note that the precise timing of the start and end of 
cartels is extremely hard to pin down. In terms of the evidence they compiled, cartels typically 18 
 
economic conditions may be ripe for cartel breakdowns. And since cartel 
breakdowns are one of the channels via which the Antitrust Division may 
get information about collusive activity, including a measure of economic 
activity is meaningful and consistent with the previous literature. 
5.  Other factors. These include, for example, the Party of the US President 
(Republican  or  Democrat).  Numerous  studies  have  examined  this:  see 
reviews of this literature in Ghosal (2006, 2008a, 2011), Ghosal and Gallo 
(2001) and Ghosal, Harrington and Stennek (2007). The key premise is 
that the Head of the Antitrust Division is appointed by the President. To 
the extent that political preferences matter, this variable would capture this 
effect. Another potential variable is the level of funding for the Antitrust 
Division. The literature shows that the level of funding does not have any 
consistent relationship to the cases filed. Part of this is undoubtedly due to 
the  fact  that  the  Antitrust  Division  has  a  baseline  budget,  one  that  is 
reported  in  the  appropriations  statistics.  In  addition,  for  cartel 
prosecutions,  hiring  of  experts,  among  other  key  litigation  driven 
activities, there is supplemental budget requests and funds. These data are 
not  readily  available  on  a  consistent  basis  and  cannot  be  included  in 
standard regressions. The baseline annual funding figures that we have 
access to do not seem to be well connected to actual cases filed in court 
and prosecuted.
15 
  Next, I focus on the timing of the effects. In section 3 I described the 
process of investigations and prosecutions, and time lags. Given this, I assume 
that most of the relevant factors may take some time to impact the number of 
prosecutions, suggesting the use of distributed -lag models. One of the variables 
that  is  expected  to  potentially  take  les s  time  is  the  number  of  grand  jury 
investigations. Once the investigations are completed, proceeding to trial can 
occur quite rapidly. Since data on precise timing of start and end dates for grand 
juries are not available, I include both current-period as well as lagged effects for 
grand jury proceedings. 
  With these considerations in mind, and replacing        
  with the above-
mentioned driving variables and their lagged values, the full specification, which 
takes the form of an autoregressive-distributed lag model, is written as: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
have lasted between 3 to 8 years. Of the cartels during the 1990s for which they have evidence, the 
average duration was about 5.4 years with a standard deviation of 4.7 years. Further evidence is 
provided by Baker (1989), Dick (1996) and Suslow (1988). 
15 See Ghosal and Gallo (2001) and Ghosal (2006, 2008a, 2011) for discussion and empirical  
results on the linkages between funding and the enforcement variables. 19 
 
                               
                                                          
 
   
                                
 
   
 
 
In the above specification, Cartel refers to the total number of cartel cases filed in 
court. The variable Regime refers to the regime shift dummy which (based on the 
earlier  discussion)  takes  value  1  for  years  ≥1980  and  0  otherwise.  The  civil 
enforcement variable Civil_(.) can be one of two effects: (a) Civil_Invs, the total 
number of civil investigations; or (b) Civil_Cases, the total number of civil cases 
filed in Court. The variables Econ and Funds refer to real GDP growth and the 
level of funding for the Antitrust Division, respectively. The grand jury variable  
GJInvs is the total number of cartel grand jury investigations. Finally, President is 
a dummy variable that takes value 1 if there is a Republican President and 0 if 
Democrat. Due to the reasons noted earlier about the potential timing of grand 
juries and cases filed in Court, the grand jury variable GJInvs is entered for the 
current period as well as two lags. The other time series variables are entered as 
lags  one  and  two  as  those  information  effects  are  expected  to  take  time  to 
materialize into investigations and cases filed in court.
16 
 
4.2.3  Estimation results 
 
The estimates from specification (2) appear in table 2. The lags were generally 
dropped  if  they  were  insignificant.  For  example,  the  GDP-2  and  Cartel-2 
coefficients  were  always  insignificant,  so  they  were  dropped.  If  in  some 
specifications the second lag was significant but not the others, then I keep the 
second  lag  even  if  it  was  insignificant;  this  is  the  case,  for  example,  for  the 
Civil_(.) variables and the GJInvs variable. The first-lags were always included in 
the estimation even if it was insignificant. The President and Funds variables had 
                                                 
16 Here I use the partial-adjustment framework to guide the empirical specification. The alternative 
methods  would  include  formulating  a  structural  model  of  competition  authority’s  decision- 
making and estimate the resulting structural parameters. However, the antitrust enforcement data 
available  are  rather  aggregated  and  largely  preclude  us  from  estimating  a  structural  model. 
Another alternative would be to estimate simultaneous-equation systems, for example Zellner’s 
seemingly-unrelated  framework,  vector-autoregression  models,  among  others.  In  previous 
analysis, Ghosal (2008a) uses antitrust enforcement data till 2002 and presents estimates with 
alternative methodologies. The results with the earlier data are similar in spirit to those presented 
in this paper. Since the primary purpose of this paper is to lay out the arguments for a policy 
proposal, I do not revisit the more technical econometric discussion, methods and results presented 
in Ghosal (2008a).      20 
 
no  impact  (statistical  significance,  or  effects  on  the  other  estimates)  in  the 
estimated equations; to save degrees of freedom (and clutter in the table), I do not 




Table 2. Dependent variable: total cartel cases filed in court 
 
  Column 1  Column 2 















































Obs.  40  40 
Adj-R
2  0.725  0.727 
Ρ  -0.008  0.041 
DW  2.002  1.917 
Notes: 
1. All data cover the period 1969-2009. 
2. p-values computed from two-tailed heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors 
(Newey and West, 1987) are in parentheses. An * denotes statistical significance at least at the 
10% level and a 
§ at the 10%-15% level. The first-order autocorrelation coefficient is denoted by 
ρ, and DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic.  
3. The point estimates for GDP are large due to scaling effects; GDP growth values are very small 
compared to the means of the explanatory variables (see table 1). 
4. As noted in the text,  I experimented  with other effects: (a) deeper lags of the explanatory 
variables; (b) including Antitrust Divisions baseline level of funding; and (c) including a dummy 
                                                 
17 The literature on the effects of the two variables, President and Funding, are overviewed in 
Ghosal and Gallo (2001) and Ghosal (2006, 2008a, 2011).   21 
 
variable for the President. These did not alter the inferences. These results are similar in spirit to 
those  using  enforcement  data  till  2002  in  Ghosal  (2008a),  in  the  sense  that  the  qualitative 
relationship between civil and criminal cases is not affected by various checks for robustness, or 
alternative methods for estimation.  
 
  The numbers in table 2 are the raw estimates. However, as we note from 
the summary statistics presented in table 1, the means and standard deviations of 
the variables vary considerably for the variables in our model. To get a better 
glimpse  of  the  implied  quantitative  effects,  in  table  3  I  present  the  estimates 
reported in table 2 multiplied by the variable’s one-standard-deviation reported in 
table 1. To focus on the main objectives of the paper, I only report the numbers 
for  Civil_Invs,  Civil_Cases,  GJInvs  and  GDP.  The  statistical  significance,  p-
values, noted in table 3 are the same as those in table 2.  
 
 
Table 3. Implied quantitative effects 
 
  Column 1  Column 2 


































1. The numbers above are the estimates from table 2 multiplied by one-standard-deviation of the 
variables (from table 1). The reported p-values are the same as those in table 2. 
 
  The key findings from tables 2 and 3 can be summarized as follows: 
1.  The Civil_Invs and Civil_Case variables are statistically significant and 
have  a  positive  effect  on  cartel  investigation  and  court  cases.  For 
Civil_Invs, the second-lag is measured more precisely statistically, and has 
a larger quantitative effect than the first-lag. For Civil_Case, the first-lag 
has marginal significance at 10.3%, but similar to Civil_Invs, the second 
lag  for  Civil_Case  is  highly  significant  and  has  a  greater  quantitative 22 
 
effect.  Overall, while there are marginal differences,  the inferences  we 
draw from using Civil_Invs or Civil_Case are similar in spirit. The fact 
that the second-lags are more significant and are quantitatively larger is 
somewhat reassuring as we expect the information flows and subsequent 
investigations and prosecutions to take time (see section 3). The fact that 
the Civil_(.) variables are statistically significant even after controlling a 
range of other relevant  variables, is  reassuring.  Turning to  the implied 
quantitative effects in table 3, they show that, starting from mean values of 
the respective variables, if there is a one-standard-deviation increase in 
the Civil_(.) variables, this would result in between 18-20 additional cartel 
cases over a 2-3 year period. While these empirical results are only meant 
to be suggestive, for the purposes of my paper the effects of the Civil_(.) 
variables  are  intriguing.  Literally  interpreted,  this  implies  that  at  least 
some of the cartel prosecutions have their roots in information unearthed 
during civil investigations and enforcement actions.
18 
2.  Grand jury investigations lead to increase in cartel prosecutions. In the two 
models  estimated  in  table  2,  current  as  well  as  lags  of  grand  jury 
investigations affect current cartel cases. While this is an expected result 
based on the pipeline of investigations argument (noted in bullet point 2, 
section 4.2.3), the estimates offer insights into the magnitude and timing 
(current and lags) of the effects. Considering the effects in table 3, a one-
standard-deviation increase in grand jury investigations, GJInvs, leads to 
approximately 15 additional cartel cases over a 2-3 year period. 
3.  Given the estimated coefficient on the lagged-dependent variable, there is 
persistence in cartel cases filed in court. In other words, more cartel cases 
filed this year, typically lead to more cases filed next year. Based on the 
comments  noted  in  section  3  (bullet  point  #1  in  origins  of  cartel 
investigations),  this  is  an  expected  result,  as  there  is  a  fair  amount  of 
evidence  on  spillover  effects  and  follow-on  investigations  and 
prosecutions. 
4.  The estimated coefficient on GDP growth is negative, which lends some 
support  for  the  Scherer  (1980)  and  Levenstein  and  Suslow  (2006) 
conjectures  and  findings.  But  the  point  estimates  of  GDP  are  not 
statistically significant at standard levels. This relative lack of statistical 
significance is in contrast to Ghosal (2008a) where the GDP effect was 
negative and statistically significant. Since the cyclical effects are not the 
                                                 
18 In this paper I use data up to the most recent year that was available (i.e., 2009) when I started 
working on this paper. In an earlier study (Ghosal, 2008a), I present findings using data till 2002 
and using alternate methodologies and variables. The findings presented above are similar in spirit 
to those obtained with earlier data, up to 2002. The consistency of these results using more recent 
data is reassuring.   23 
 
main focus of this paper, I do not discuss this further.   
  While I don’t present the tables using individuals and firms prosecuted as 
the dependent variables, those results and inferences are similar in spirit to the 
results presented in tables 2 and 3. For more elaborate econometric analysis of 
these dynamics using antitrust enforcement data up to 2002, see Ghosal (2008a). 
  The findings from the estimation in tables 2 and 3 can be summarized as 
follows. First, they provide some evidence that a greater number of non-cartel 
investigations and cases lead to an increase in cartel cases and prosecutions. This 
appears  to  indicate  that  non-cartel  investigations  provide  at  least  some  of  the 
valuable  “seed”  information  for  cartel  cases.  Second,  this  econometric  result 
appears  roughly  consistent  with  the  anecdotal  information  and  illustrative 
examples  provided  in  section  4.1,  which  pointed  to  specific  case-related 
information  on  information  spillovers  from  the  non-cartel  to  cartel  areas  of 
competition  law  enforcement.  Overall,  while  there  is  some  evidence  under 
existing administrative and legal structures for information spillovers from non-
cartel to cartel investigations, undoubtedly the restrictive legal and administrative 
processes constrain  the extent of “information mining”  that can be conducted 
from all the information contained in the non-cartel investigations. 
 
5.  A proposal to enhance cartel enforcement 
 
In  sections  4.1  and  4.2  I  provided  some  insights  into  the  potential  linkages 
between non-cartel investigations and cases, and cartel prosecutions. In section 2, 
I noted that many jurisdictions have explicit administrative and legal rules that 
prohibit the direct use of information from a non-cartel case to prosecute cartels. 
While these restrictions do not necessarily prevent the eventual prosecution of 
cartels from such information as the information could potentially be re-gathered 
as part of a separate independent investigation, they can cause significant delays 
and  inject  administrative  and  legal  uncertainty  into  the  subsequent 
investigations.
19  A change in r ules can potentially increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of cartel enforcement. 
  In this section, I first discuss some of the key aspects of M&As as noted in 
the  management,  corporate  strategy   and  economics  literatures.  Mainly,  I 
emphasize  that  M&As  can  have  far -reaching  longer-run  benefits  than  are 
commonly portrayed in some of the literature. If we examine the totality of the 
effects that may arise from M&As, the benefits appear considerably larger than 
made out in those studies that assess the  relatively shorter-run profit effects of 
                                                 
19  For  example,  the  relatively  recent  non-cartel  investigations  at  South  Africa’s  Competition 
Commission  in  the  plastic  pipes  and  scrap  metal  industries,  which  ultimately  lead  to  cartel 
investigations  and  prosecutions  (OECD,  2010;  and  Ngobeni,  2010),  highlights  some  of  the 
problems. 24 
 
M&As.  Next,  I  spell  out  the  proposal,  and  discuss  the  incentive  issues  and 
benefits  of  the  proposal.  The  proposal  described  noted  below  is  general  and 
designed to be considered by any jurisdiction. Given the significance of M&As in 
firms’ shorter and, more importantly, longer-run business strategies, I argue that if 
a penalty (as defined by the proposal) is imposed on bad behavior (i.e., collusion), 
it may have an important deterrent effect on firms’ incentives to form cartels. I 
end this section by discussing the potential downsides of the proposal.  
 
5.1  Importance of M&As in firms’ overall business strategy 
 
According to Thomson Financial, in the year 2000, globally firms spent about 
$3.5 trillion in M&As. In 2008, with a significant economic downturn, global 
M&As were valued at about $3 trillion, down from about $4 trillion in 2007. For 
comparison, Germany’s GDP in 2009 was about $3.4 trillion. The US economy 
itself sees several thousand M&As per year, often more than 8-10 thousand per 
year. The fact that firms engage in such a large volume of M&As every year 
indicates that they must be an important part of their strategic business decisions.  
   Firms engage in M&As for a variety of reasons and it is important to 
recognize that the underlying objectives include meeting their shorter-term and/or 
longer-term strategic goals. A more comprehensive understanding of M&As is 
required to highlight their importance for firms’ business strategies. As has been 
noted in the literature, some of the motivations for M&As include: 
1.  Obtaining  new  knowledge  about  products  and  processes,  and  skills, 
including  acquiring  key  technical  personnel.  Here  M&As  can  act  as 
substitute for firms’ R&D expenditures and innovation investments; 
2.  Entering new product or geographic market segments. These often relate 
to  strategies  for  actual  or  potential  (or  exploratory)  diversification  and 
differentiation; 
3.  Enhancing production capacity. This can be thought of as a pure physical 
investment objective;  
4.  Reallocation of potentially valuable and productive assets into the hands 
of more able managers; 
5.  Response to changes in market rules and regulations; and 
6.  Empire building or hubris. 
  For the purposes of illustration and to highlight a key aspect, below I only 
focus on the first type (above) which can be broadly classified as knowledge-
based M&As., while noting that the essence of the arguments I make can also be 
made for other motivations for M&As (items 2-5 above). The literature on R&D 
and  innovation  motivated  M&As,  for  example,  notes  that  the  technological 
performance and benefits of such M&As are expected to reveal themselves only 25 
 
in  the  longer-run.
20  It is precisely these longer -run  effects  on  firms’  strategic 
variables that are likely to be underestimated in the typical evaluation of M&As 
which  often  tends  to  focus  on  the  shorter-term  economic  effects  related  to 
profits.
21 In the longer-run, synergies between the companies can contribute to 
technological  performance  and  progress ,  and  result  in  process  and  produ ct 
innovations.  Some of  these  new innovations  can,  in  the longer -run, lead  to 
improved performance and firms’ position in the market in a dynamic context. 
  Equally  important,  even  when  we  may  observe  no  post-M&A  upward 
trajectory in a firm’s profit or market-share position, the key knowledge-based 
M&As can help stem potential future declines in a firm’s market position. In other 
words,  had  the  knowledge-based  M&A  not  taken  place,  we  would  have  seen 
declines  in  profits  and  market  shares,  but  since  we  do  not  observe  the 
counterfactual, we may tend to view such M&As as not being important. 
  In some instances, there may, of course, be shorter-run benefits when the 
acquiring firm obtains access to R&D and technological capabilities to produce an 
existing, combined technological output. If the capabilities emanating from such 
M&As, however, are used in the development of new technological output, the 
shorter-term  effects  can  be  quite  negligible  in  comparison  to  the  longer-term 
technological benefits. 
  The  complex  technological  effects  of  M&As  in  high-tech  sectors  have 
been  studied  extensively  in  the  innovation  and  management  literatures  where 
increased size of companies and synergies, through internal growth or by means 
of M&As, are positively related to longer-term technological performance, and 
better  strategic  positioning  of  the  firms.  Di  Guardo  and  Valentini  (2007),  for 
example, note that the effects of M&As on firms’ technological performance are 
complex  as  they  simultaneously  alter  the  resources  firms  can  use  in  their 
innovation  process  as  well as  the incentive structure related to the innovation 
process. Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002), for example, study the global computer 
industry and find that linking up to more R&D intensive companies generates 
strong results in terms of higher technological performance. They argue that R&D 
intensive M&As are instrumental to the more general process of “exploratory” 
learning  and  play  an  important  role  in  the  improvement  of  technological 
competencies that are crucial for companies to remain competitive in a high-tech 
environment. 
  Similarly,  if  we  examine  the  treatment  of  cross-border  mergers  in  the 
corporate  strategy  literature,  it  has  somewhat  of  a  different  take  than  in  the 
economics literature. Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath and Pisano (2004), for example, 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Sueverkruep (1994), Hagedoorn and Duysters 
(2002), Gerpott (1995) and Grandstrand, Bohlin, Oskarsson and Sjoberg (1992), Hitt, Hoskisson, 
Ireland and Harrison (1991), Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel (1996) and Oster (1994). 
21 See, for example, Caves (1989), Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh (1989), and Paulter (2003). 26 
 
present  a  detailed  assessment  of  the  theoretical  and  empirical  management 
literature. They argue that cross-border M&As can be used to access new and 
lucrative markets, expand the market for a firm’s current goods, take advantage of 
a new opportunities, to avoid a possible future threat, and as an opportunities to 
acquire learn new knowledge and capabilities. Arguably, many of the important 
aspects of these effects are likely to reveal themselves in the acquiring firms’ 
longer-run opportunity set as opposed to pure short-term benefits. 
  For the purposes of my paper, I summarize the M&A issue as follows. 
There is a clear belief in both the management and economics literatures that 
many  M&A  activities  remain  unsuccessful.  The  reported  failure  rates  are 
estimated to be anywhere between 50% to 80%.
22 However, the reported broad 
failure and survival statistics often miss the nuances that differentiate different 
types of M&As and the specific effects, making i t difficult to truly assess the 
strategic importance of M&As. I briefly discuss some findings to highlight this. 
  Walker (2000), for example, investigates the strategic objectives and the 
specifics of the transactions details and how they affect performanc e of the 
acquiring  firms.  He  finds  that  the  acquiring -firms’  shareholders  earn  higher 
returns as a result of takeovers that expand the firm’s operations geographically, 
and that shareholders of the acquiring-firm earn higher returns following “cash 
offers”.  Homburg  and  Bucerius  (2006)  focus  on  the  speed  of  post-merger 
integration. Their findings,  from  a survey of 232 horizontal M&As show that 
speed is most beneficial when external relatedness is low and at the same time 
internal relatedness is high. In contrast, speed is highly detrimental in the case of 
low  internal  and  high  external  relatedness.  Cloodt,  Hagedoorn  and  van 
Kranenburg  (2006) examine the post-M&A performance of acquiring firms  in 
four major high-tech sectors. They find that  non-technological M&As appear to 
have  a  negative  impact  on  the  acquiring  firm’s  post-M&A  innovative 
performance, while for technological M&As a large relative size of the acquired 
knowledge base reduces the innovative performance of the acquiring firm. 
  Focarelli,  Panetta  and  Salleo  (2002)  examine  the  financial  services 
markets and find that expanding revenues from financial services is a strategic 
objective for “mergers”, whereas improving the quality of the loan portfolio is 
central for “acquisitions”. Selling more services seems to require a merger, that is, 
a  takeover  of  the  target  bank  followed  by  a  full  integration  of  its  marketing 
network with that of the bidder. When the objective of improving the passive 
bank’s  loan  portfolio  is  crucial,  the  purchase  of  a  controlling  stake  seems 
sufficient to transfer superior lending competence from the active to the passive 
bank,  thus  avoiding  the  high  costs  that  usually  accompany  full  integration. 
Empirical results in Cummins and Xie (2008) indicate that M&As in property-
                                                 
22  For  example,  see  Andrade,  Mitchell  and  Stafford  (2001),  Marks  and  Mirvis  (2001)  and 
Tetenbaum (1999). Peltier (2004) presents some interesting media industry M&A information. 27 
 
liability insurance industry had diverse effects. For example, while the acquiring 
firms achieved more revenue efficiency gains than non-acquiring firms, the target 
firms experienced greater cost and allocative efficiency growth than non-targets. 
They  conclude  that  factors  other  than  efficiency  enhancement  are  important 
factors in property-liability insurer M&As. The literature surveyed in the above 
papers also provide noteworthy insights into the complexities of assessing the 
successes and failures of M&As.  
  In  my  view,  there  is  a  deeper  conceptual  problem  with  examining  the 
M&A success/failure rates. The failure rate, whatever this number might be, is not 
the paramount indicator determining whether M&As are important, and a key 
component of firms’ corporate strategies. M&As, therefore, are best thought of as 
“complex gambles” with significant uncertainty in outcomes. An analogy could 
be offered from the multiple R&D lines for pharmaceutical companies. Typically, 
less than 5% of the R&D lines yield successes for pharmaceutical companies, and 
an even smaller percentage lead to significant revenues and profits; for the major 
pharmaceutical companies, of the hundreds of drugs they may sell, the top 3-4 
drugs typically account for over 50%-60% of the total revenues. Does this mean 
that  multiple  R&D  lines  are  not  important  to  them?  Of  course,  not. 
Pharmaceutical companies need to have a large number of ongoing R&D lines in 
order to  get  the few key  successes. Similarly,  a firm  may engage in  multiple 
M&As, realistically expecting that only a small number may work out, due to 
complexities  of  integrating  different  organizations,  potentially  different 
technologies, workforce, initial information asymmetries between the acquiring 
and target firms, among others.
23 
  Overall, the above discussion, while noting the complexities of assessing 
the precise successes and failures of M&As, makes clear that they are a critical 
part of firms’ shorter-run and, more importantly, longer-run business  strategy. 
Given this, my assumption is that any impediments, or penalties, imposed on the 
approval of M&As will likely be viewed as detrimental to their core longer-run 
business interests.  
 
5.2  Proposal to enhance cartel enforcement 
 
                                                 
23 For example, Schuler and Jackson (2001) note that firm’s need to systematically address a 
variety of complex human resource issues in their post-M&A organizational and integration plans 
to  make their  M&As  successful. They  note that  many of the M&A  failures can be traced to 
difficulties in resolving HR issues. Salz (2006) notes a survey of senior executives of large US and 
European companies which reveals that cultural fit is critical for deal success. Respondents in the 
survey rated it more important than other commonly cited business priorities including strategic 
rationale, leadership and integration planning. The results of the survey of executives also cited 
cultural differences and cultural resistance as issues that surprised them the most during the post-
merger integration. 28 
 
The  proposal:  explicitly  sanction  competition  law  enforcement  authorities  to 
directly  use  information  obtained  during  non-cartel  (M&A  and 
monopolization/dominance)  investigations  to  prosecute  cartels.  If  a  non-cartel 
investigation (e.g., M&A) by the competition authority provides information on 
collusion with subsequent investigation and prosecution, then: 
1.  The M&A is blocked; and 
2.  The  jurisdiction’s  fines  and  other  penalties  related  to  collusion  are 
imposed. 
As noted in section 5.1, since M&As can have appreciable longer-term strategic 
benefits  for  firms,  blocking  of  the  M&A  imposes  a  penalty,  which,  in  some 
circumstances, may be more damaging to the firm’s business interests than the 
monetary and other cartel related penalties. 
  Following up on the discussion and analysis in sections 4.1 and 4.2, my 
contention is that the extent of discovery of “seed” information regarding cartel 
activities  from  non-cartel  investigations  would  be  greater  if  the  legal  and 
administrative barriers for information spillovers were lower, and the competition 
authorities were allowed to explicitly engage in information mining about cartel 
activities. Non-cartel investigations, such as M&As, often reveal rich data and 
information about the merging firms, potentially other firms in that market, and 
sometimes  about  related  markets.  Similarly,  for  monopolization/dominance 
investigations. If a firm is undergoing a M&A evaluation or is being investigated 
for monopolization, and if that firm is engaging in collusive activity, there is a 
reasonable  likelihood  that  the  competition  authority’s  investigative  procedures 
may be able to detect this behavior. Overall, by sanctioning information mining 
and  allowing  for  direct  use  of  information,  non-cartel  investigations  and 
enforcement actions may end up revealing a variety of useful information about 
potential collusive activity. 
  Since obtaining the “seed” information about cartel activity is arguably 
the  most  important  component  in  the  fight  against  cartels,  this  would  add  a 
valuable tool in the competition law enforcement of cartels.  
 
5.3  Potential benefits of the proposal 
 
The proposal is likely to have a meaningful deterrent effect on firms’ propensities 
to collude, as well as to continue with existing collusive agreements. As noted in 
section  5.1,  M&As,  for  example,  may  be  vital  to  many  firms’  core  business 
strategies  and  longer-run  success.  If  firms  know  that  information  gathered  by 
competition authorities during M&A approvals, or other non-cartel investigations, 
can  be  directly  used  to  prosecute  for  collusion  and  to  block  the  M&As,  they 
would be less likely to engage in collusion. While collusion may yield the firms 
shorter or medium term profits, the trade-off of jeopardizing their core business 29 
 
strategies could be a harsh one. 
  The penalty arising from the proposal would be more severe on specific 
types of firms. If independent grocery stores or gas stations (petrol pumps) in a 
small town are price-fixing, the proposal noted above is not likely to have an 
effect on their incentives to collude as these types of business units are typically 
not in the M&A market. But larger domestic and multinational firms that produce 
differentiated goods and services and are diversified may be more affected by the 
proposal as they are often the ones that are very active in the M&A market. For 
example,  as  we  look  at  some  of  the  prominent  cartel  prosecutions  of  large 
multinationals in lysine, vitamins, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, semiconductors, 
airlines, and other industries, a lot of these firms are very active in the M&A 
market. The proposal, by explicitly sanctioning information mining, and direct 
use  of  information  obtained  during  M&A  reviews,  and  other  non-cartel 
investigations, to prosecute potential cartels, may reveal the “seed” information 
about collusion, which is critical to prosecuting cartels. 
  This greater probability of detection, generated by the proposal, may act as 
an important deterrent. Finally, it seems fair to argue that prosecuting the larger, 
hardcore  and  international  cartels  is  more  desirable  from  a  welfare  gain 
standpoint.  That  the  proposal  puts  these  types  of  firms  on  the  antitrust 
enforcement radar in a more visible manner, due to their greater activity in the 
M&A market, implies that potential increases in the efficiency and effectiveness 
of cartel enforcement, and welfare gains, can be large. These gains are probable 
irrespective of exactly how many cartels are actually prosecuted via this channel, 
and arise due to the likelihood of the proposal creating a meaningful deterrent 
effect. 
 
5.4  Potential downsides of the proposal 
 
Given the proposal, we have to consider the possibility of situations where the 
information processing by the competition authority leads to cartel investigations, 
when in fact there is no problem. That is, the likelihood of a false positive, or a 
Type 1  error. To  be clear, it is  not  likely that  there  will be  any actual  cartel 
prosecutions as a result of these Type 1 errors. Actual prosecution of cartels, with 
imposition  of  fines  and  other  penalties,  require  substantial  evidence  of  actual 
collusion,  to  be  proven  in  court.  What  we  are  concerned  about  is  potential 
suspicion,  investigation,  harassment  of  firms,  and  potential  damage  to  their 
reputations, when in fact there was no collusive activity at all. So we are not 
looking at strict Type 1 errors which would result in actual cartel prosecution, but 
more of a weak Type 1 error with no actual prosecution, but investigation related 
consequences. Type 1 errors, in their strict or weak form, are not uncommon in 
competition law enforcement actions. For example, Duso, Gugler and Yurtoglu 30 
 
(2007, 2011) examine Type 1 and Type 2 errors in the context of EU merger 
enforcement.  
  Given the proposal laid out in section 5.2, there are at least two potential 
costs to consider: 
1.  Damage  to  a  firm’s  reputation  and  harassment  by  the  competition 
authority,  and  the  likelihood  that  the  proposal  may  generate  a 
disincentive for some firms to file for M&As; and 
2.  Increased  administrative  and  investigative  costs  by  the  competition 
authority that may arise from implementing the proposal. 
  Regarding  the  administrative  and  investigative  costs  that  would  be 
incurred by the competition authority, it needs to be kept in mind that such issues 
also  arise  in  the  context  of  merger  (and  monopolization/dominance) 
investigations, where many more mergers are reviewed compared to actual court 
cases. For example, between 2005-2009, the US Department of Justice received 
on average about 1,606 Hart-Scott-Rodino merger filings per year, but only about 
7 antitrust merger cases were filed in court per year; only a tiny fraction, 0.4%, of 
the  HSRs  received  translated  to  actual  court  cases.  Regarding  European 
Commission  enforcement,  the data in  Duso, Gugler  and (2010) show that the 
proportion of merger cases that went to Phase II was 5.5% before the introduction 
of the new merger regulation, and 2.6% after. The bottom line is that the number 
of mergers that are blocked or seriously challenged are a disproportionately small 
fraction compared to the total number of mergers reviewed, and administrative 
and investigative reviews conducted.  
  The  onus,  therefore,  is  on  the  efficient  organizational  structure  of  the 
competition authority, as well as the administrative, legal and political checks and 
balances that are typically imposed on competition agencies, to weed out bogus 
investigations,  and  focus  only  on  those  that  matter.  Regarding  the  issue  of 
disincentives,  assuming  that  the  competition  authority  minimizes  bogus 
investigations,  such  disincentives,  and  damage  to  a  firm’s  reputation,  are 
minimized. Equally important, if a firm is not engaging in collusive activity then 
there is nothing to fear as there is no penalty of the sort laid out in section 5.2. 
  While  both  the  costs  noted  above  are  legitimate  and  important 
considerations,  they  can  be  minimized  in  a  steady-state  competition  law 
enforcement  regime  with  appropriate  checks  and  balances  framed  within  the 
administrative, legal and political processes. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks 
 
Cartels  can  cause  significant  damage  to  markets  in  numerous  dimensions.  A 
reduction in collusive activity, therefore, not only benefits the consumers and the 
economy  in  terms  of  lower  prices  of  goods  and  services,  but  also  potentially 31 
 
produces beneficial effects related to product variety and quality, and innovation. 
In  antitrust/competition  law  enforcement,  most  of  the  focus,  and  the  visible 
impacts,  are  related  to  prices.  In  part  this  is  due  to  the  relatively  easier 
quantification of prices. The effects related to product variety and quality, and 
innovation, are more difficult to quantify. The key point to note is that the price-
based damages effects are a lower-bound on the true economic damage caused by 
cartels. 
  Given  this,  it  is  crucial  to  implement  mechanisms  that  provide 
disincentives to form cartels as well as continuation of existing conspiracies. The 
corporate  amnesty/leniency  programs  that  were  implemented  by  the  US 
Department of Justice in 1978, revised in 1993, and bolstered by the Antitrust 
Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (ACPERA) of 2004 (and revised 
and extended to 2020), do exactly this.
24 Similarly for the programs that were 
instituted in the EU and many other jurisdictions later; by recent count, close to 
100 competition jurisdictions have some form of corporate amnesty/leniency 
program. The amnesty programs, by encouraging defectors, destabilize existing 
cartels and likely reduce incentives to form of cartels. The high monetary fines, 
and incarceration in some jurisdictions, add  to  the  “stick”  component  of  the 
competition enforcement actions against cartels.
25 
  The proposal I lay out in this paper – which would sanction the direct use 
of  data  and  information  from  non-cartel  investigations  to  investigate  and 
prosecute  cartels  –  is  likely  to  add  to  the  disincentives  to  form  cartels  and 
continuation of existing conspiracies.  My  argument was based on examining the 
management,  corporate  strategy  and  economics  literatures,  where  M&As,  for 
example, form an integral part of firms’ core business strategy, with potentially 
important  longer-run  gains  to  their  business  operations  and  market  positions. 
While collusion may provide the shorter-run gains in profits that firms seek, but 
the  trade-off  of  being  discovered  via  a  non-cartel  (e.g.,  M&A)  competition 
authority investigation with the resulting penalties (see section 5.2) may be quite 
harsh. I discussed the potential benefits and downsides of the proposal, and the 
specific types of firms that are more likely to be affected by this proposal, which 
                                                 
24 A recent paper by Sokol (2011), however, paints a far more complex picture of the leniency 
programs. Sokol notes that there is likelihood of strategic gaming of leniency if a competition 
authority has a generous leniency program. In his questionnaire survey study, Sokol finds that the 
majority of practitioners stated that the leniency program may be, strategically, used to punish 
rivals as well, as aid in enforcing collusion. This provides evidence supporting Miller (2009). As 
Sokol notes, the important issues therefore are the frequency and severity of the strategic gaming. 
Bottom line is that if these are high, then the overall effectiveness of the leniency program is far 
more complex and ambiguous, and does not lend easily to the stated claims of huge success by the 
competition authorities. 
25 For discussion of a related mechanism of instituting an individual whistleblower provision for 
cartel detection, see the discussion in Ghosal (2008b).  32 
 
are likely to be the larger domestic and multinational firms. Since most firms 
engaged in hardcore domestic and international cartels fit this profile, the proposal 
brings on the radar exactly those firms that need to be carefully scrutinized. 
  While  in  sections  2  and  4.1  I  discussed  illustrative  examples  of  cartel 
cases emanating from non-cartel investigations, I return to the example related to 
South Africa’s Competition Commission. Two collusion cases were detected via 
merger reviews.
26 The first case relates to merger review in the market for plastic 
pipes,  used mainly by municipalities in the provision of water and sanitation. 
South Africa’s Competition Commission brought the case against the two pipe 
manufacturers and five others in January 2009, accusing the companies of bid-
rigging,  price-fixing,  and  market  and  customer  allocation.  Eventually,  South 
Africa’s Competition Tribunal levied a 5 million rand settlement between Flo-Tek 
Pipes and Irrigation Ltd. and the South African Competition Commission, and 
approved  a  7  million  rand  settlement  with  Swan  Plastics.  Both  companies 
admitted to violating South Africa’s Competition Act and agreed to pay penalties 
representing  6%  of  their  turnover  for  2007.  For  the  scrap  metal  case,  the 
Commission  initiated  an  investigation  into  possible  collusion  in  this  industry 
following its prohibition of a horizontal merger in the industry in February 2006. 
The merger documentation implicated the parties in anti-competitive behavior in 
the collection and supply of ferrous and non-ferrous scrap metal. South Africa’s 
Commission found evidence of collusive tendering in the 2007 auction of wagons, 
coaches,  and  tankers  by  state  owned  rail  transport  entity,  Spoornet  (Transnet 
Freight Rail). In both these cases, it took South Africa’s Competition Commission 
much time to initiate new cartel investigations against the firms and gather new 
evidence, causing delays and administrative and legal uncertainties. 
  The main question: if the rules explicitly sanctioned the (South African) 
Competition Authority to information mine non-cartel investigations, and directly 
use those data and information to prosecute cartels, would the firms have lesser 
incentive  to  collude?  My  answer,  based  on  the  discussion  of  the  strategic 
importance of M&As to firms (see section 5.1), is likely to be yes. Assuming a 
well  functioning  and  active  competition  law  enforcement  authority,  the  main 
conditioning statement relates to the specific types of firms the proposal would 
affect more: those that are larger, differentiated and diversified firms operating in 
domestic  and  international  markets  as  they  are  far  more  active  in  the  M&A 
                                                 
26 For the plastic pipes case, see: The Competition Commission vs. DPI Plastics, Petzetakis Africa, 
Marley Pipes System, Swan Plastics, Amitech South Africa, Flo-Tek Pipes & Irrigation, Macneil 
Agencies, Andrag and Gazelle Plastics (Case number 2008Mar3596). For the scrap metal case, 
see: The Competition Commission vs. The New Reclamation Group (Reclam), Aberddac Group, 
Amalgamated  Metals  Recycling,  Ben  Jacobs  Metals,  Power  Metals,  SA  Metal  and  Universal 
Recycling (2007Aug3121). 33 
 
market. Smaller, local, firms, that are not (less) active in the M&A market are not 
likely to be caught by this rule change.
27 
  Overall,  the  deterrence  effect  of  my  proposal,  particularly  on  larger, 
multiproduct,  and  multinational  firms,  is  likely  to  be  meaningful.  Given  that 
collusion by these types of firms can result in significant economic damage, this 
additional deterrence, and the likely lower incidence of collusion, may enhance 
the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  fight  against  cartels  and  provide 
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